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I. STATEMENT OF THE CASE
A.

Nature of the case.
This appeal arises from the district court s dismissal of common law claims made by

Appellant Dar'n Bergeman (Bergeman) regarding the nonjudicial foreclosure sale of real
property in Idaho Falls, Idaho. The property was own d by Karen Hansen, Bergeman's mother.
Ms. Hansen entered into a mortgage loan secured by a deed of trust on the property. Respondent
Select Portfolio Servicing, Inc. (SPS) serviced the loan. After Ms. Hansen died in 2006,
Bergeman occupied the property and made payments on the loan, but he did not assume the loan.
In 2015, the loan went into default. In February 2017, the property was foreclosed and sold to
Respondent Mohamed Elabed (Elabed).
In his second amended complaint, Bergeman alleged the foreclosure sale was wrongfol
and invalid. He sought to set aside the foreclosure sale, enjoin a separate eviction action brought
by Rlabed, and hold SPS and Elabed (and other defendants) liable for money damages, all based
on claims of misrepresentation, negligent supervision, trespass, and the infliction of emotional
di stress. Before the district court, Bergeman moved to consolidate thi s_action with Elabed's
eviction action under Idaho Rule of Civil Procedure 42(a), and that motion was denied. SPS and
Elabed each moved to dismiss Bergeman' s compla int under Idaho Rule of Civil Procedure
12(b)(6), and those motions were gr.anted,
On appeal, Bergeman contends the district court erred in dismissing his complaint and in
denying his motion to consolidate. But in his opening brief, Bergeman offers no analysis and
cites no authority to support his assignments of error, Perhaps most obvious, he does not cite a
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single element of any of his cause.s of action, and he offe1 no analysis of how the fac tual
allegations in the second amended complaint relate to or support those claims. He a1so does not
explain how the district comi abused its discretion in denying his motion to consolidate. A party
waives an issue cited on appeal if either authority or argument is lacking. This Court should
affirm the district court's rulings for that reason alone.
But even if Bergeman has not waived hi s appeal issues, he still has not shown enor by
the district court. The second amend d complaint is premised on conclusory allegations that the
foreclosme sale was wrongful and that SPS is liable for misrepresentation, negligent supervision,
trespass, and the infliction of emotional distress. However, Bergeman alleged no facts to show
that the foreclosure violated Idaho's foreclosure requirements. He also admitted that the
mortgage loan was in default, that he never assumed the loan, and that Ms. Hansen's estate
remained the borrower on the loan. Because Bergeman failed to allege facts to support any of his
claims, the district court correctly dismissed his second amended complaint under Rule 12(b)(6).
As for his motion to consolidate, Bergeman fails to show how the district court violated any part
of the three-part abuse of discretion standard.
The Court should affirm the district court' s rulings that the second amended complaint
states no valid cause of.action against SP ' and that consolidation of this action and Elabed's
evicti on action was not appropri ate.

B.

Statement of facts and com~ e of proceedings.
Because the trial court deci,ded this case on motions to dismiss, the facts are set forth in

Bergeman' s second amended complaint and the exhibits attached to, i.ncorporated into, and made

-2-

part of the complaint. See R. 36-66. 1 More legible copie-s of the exhibits are found at R. 16~35.
1.

After Bergeman's mother died, he occupied the property and paid the
mortgage loan,. but he did not assume the loan.

Bcrgeman's mother, Karen Hans n, own d real property Jocated at 1623 \Vest 145 No11h
Idaho Fal1s, Idal10 83401. R. 38-39

(iii!

I 0-1 1).

he propetty consists of a home and acreage. R.

38 c,j 10). In October 1998, Ms. Hansen executed a pi· missory note and, as security for the note,
granted a deed of trust on the property in favor of WMC Mortgage Corporation (WMC
Mort a e . See R. 36-37 (~ 2), 53, 55, 61. The deed of trust was recorded in the mortgage
records of Bonneville County. See R. 53, 55. The mortgage loan and deed of trust were
eventually assigned to U.S. Bank National Association as trustee (U.S, Bank). R. 37 (il 3), 53,
55. SPS is currently the servicer for the loan. R. 37

(ii 4).

After Ms. Hansen's death in 2006, Bergeman took possession of the property. R. 39
12). Mortgage statements continued to be sent to the "Estate of Karen Hansen." R. 39

(i!

(i! 13).

Bergeman made payments on the loan, which were accepted and credited to the loan. R. 39 ('i['i[
12-13). Bergeman, however, did not assume the mortgage. R. 39

('ii 13). In March 2012, Donald

Hansen, the executor of Ms. Hansen's estate, granted Bergeman an executor's deed for the
property in exchange for $10. R. 36 ('ii 1), 48.
2.

Bergeman stopped paying on the loan in 2015, t.he loan went into default, and
Elabed bought the property at foireclosure sale in February 2017.

In July 2015, Bergeman was convicted of a probation violati.on and sentenced to serve
time in an Idaho correctional facility. R. 39 ('ii 12). Around that time, Bergeman stopped making
1

The Clerk' s Record is cited as "R." and the Clerk's Supplemental Record is cited as
"Supp.R" The transcript is cited as " Tr." Appellant's Opening Brief is cited as ..AOB."
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payments on the mortgage loan. In the second amended complaint~Bergeman alleges he either
mad payments or made arrangements for others to make payments until the fal] of 2016. Id. But
a Notice of Default recorded in Bonneville County in September 20 16 states that Ms. Hansen or
her successor in interest had not made monthly payments since February 2015 and was in default
on the loan. R. 55-56; see also R. 6 1 ("As of February 15, (2017]! you ~r 745 days delinquent on
your mortgage loan."). Despite this discrepancy, Bergeman admits the loan was in default. See

R. 40 (~[ 14); see also AOB 9, 16~17, 18, 19 (recognizing Bergernan's admissions that the loan
was in default).
According to the Notice of Default, through September 2016, Ms. Hansen owed
$11,278.02, plus $221.34 in late charges and $1,047.38 in other fees and costs. R. 56. In
addition, the Notice of Default declared that $30,942.62 in principal and $5,486.81 in interest,
plus an escrow balance of$10,382.55, was immediately due. Id. The Notice of Default was
followed in October 20 16 by a Trustee's Notice of Sale, which announced the property would be
sold at a foreclosure sale on February 23, 2017. R. 53-54. The Notice of Default and Trustee's
Notice of Sale were posted on the property, R. 58, and notice of the foreclosure sale was also
published in The Post Register, R. 59-60.
On December 30, 2016, an Affidavit of Mailing of Trustee's Notice of Sale was recorded
in Bonneville County, along with the

otice of Default and Trustee's Notice of Sale. R. 50-57;

see also R. 18-25. According to the affidavit, the notices were mailed to the Estate of Karen
Hansen, Donald Hansen (as the executor of the Estate of Karen Hansen), the heirs and devisees
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of Karen Hansen, Darin Bergeman the spouse of Dadn Bergeman, and the occupants of the
property. R. 50-5].

During this time, SPS continu d to ·end monthly mort 0 a 0 stat ments to the state of
Karen l ansen. R. 39 (,f 1 "), 41

,r 16(e)). In F

bruar 20]7, PS

nt a stateme1t sta:tingthatthe

estate owed $17,932.87 on the mortgage loan. R. 39 (,r 13), 6]-63; see also R. 29-3 1. According
to Bergeman, the statements misrepresented that the foreclosure sale could and would be vacated
" in the event the plaintiff made a mortgage payment." R. 41

(,r 16(e)). The February 2017

statement, however, contains no such statement. See R. 61-63; see also R. 29-31. It states that
$17,932.87 was due and must be paid to bring the loan current. R. 61; see also R. 29.
Bergeman also alleges that because he was incarcerated, he was unable to sp ak with the
defendants named in the second amended complaint. R. 40

(ii

14). He appointed his father, Jerry

Bergeman, to make arrangem nts to cure any default of the mortgage loan. Id.; R. 64-66. Jerry
Bergeman made numerous efforts to speak with the defendants, but those efforts were ignored.

R. 40 (if 14). Bergeman alleges that the defendants refused to discuss the status of the mortgage
foreclosure with anyone other than the executor of Ms. Hansen's estate. R. 41 (,J 16(a), (b)).
Despite their refusal to discuss (he mortgage foreclosure, Bergeman also alJeges the
defendants indicated they "would accept a certain payment, including penalties and interest, from
the plaintiff' but then refosed to accept a payment of approximately $16,000 wired prior to the
foreclosure sale. R. 41 (,r 16(c)).. A lso, the defendants purportedly accepted another payment of
19,422.87 from Bergeman and admitted that the foreclosure sale was vacated and invalidated.
R. 41 (i l6(f)). Bergeman does not state when those payments were made. [n any event, the
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foreclosure sa]e went forward on February 23, 2017 ,. " ith the a sistance of AUiance Title
Company (Alliance Title). See R. 37

(if

5-6). Elabed purchased the property at the foreclosure

sale through Silvercreek Realty Group (Silvercreek Realty). See R. 37-38 ( 6), 42 ( 16(i)).

3.

The trial court denied Bergeman's motion to consolidate and dismissed his
second amended complaint for failure to state a claim upon which relief
could be granted.

In March 20 17, Bergeman filed a complaint R. 7-35. Then in April 2017, he filed an
amended complaint against SPS, labed, WMC Mortgage, U.S. Bank, Alliance Title, Silvercreek
Realty, and John Does 1-6. R. 67-95. Ultimately Bergeman served only Elabed, and SPS
appeared. Bergeman filed a motion to consolidate this action with a separate action Elabed had
filed to vict the tenant of the property. Supp.R. 1. Ela bed filed the eviction action in Bonneville
County magistrate court (Case No. CV 2017-1746). R. 43

(,r 20); see also Supp.R. 13-1 6. The

district court denied the motion to consolidate. R. 98- 100.
Later in April, Bergeman filed another amended complaint against the same defendants.
R. 36. In his second amended complaint, Bergeman alleged claims of misrepresentation and/or
negligent supervision, trespass, intentional infliction of emotional distress, and negligent
infliction of emotional distress. R. 40-45

(,r,r 15-26). His prayer for relief asked: (1) for an award

of damages, (2) that the nonjudicial foreclosure action be set aside, and (3) for injunctive relief
directing Elabed to stop the eviction action. Bergeman also alleged that the defendants "were and
still are agents for one another, and are acting under the course and scope of their employment or
agency thereof, with knowledge and consent of each other." R. 38 ( 8).
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SPS and Elabed both moved to dismiss the second amended complain:t based on
Bergeman 's failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted under I.R.C.P. 12(b)(6).
Supp.R. 60 93 . Bergeman did not move to amend his second amended complaint. See generally
R. 2-6. The district court heard the motions on May 18, 20 17, considering only the facts set forth
in the second amended complaint and its exhibits. See Tr. 13:2-7>52: 17- 19; R. 104, The district
court granted the motions to dismiss on June 5>20 17, R. I 03-111 , a1t1d issued a judgment that
same day, R. 114. On July 13, 2017, Bei geman fil ed a notice of appeal. R. 11 7.

II. ISSUES PRESENTED ON APPEAL
SPS states the issues on appeal as:

1.

Did the trial court correctly dismiss Bcrgeman's second amended couplaint for

failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted?
2.

Did the trial court corr ctly deny Bergeman's motion to consolidate this action

with Elabed's eviction action?
3.

Is SPS entitled to attorney fees on appeal under Idaho Code§ 12- 121?

III. ST AND ARD OF REVIEW
Motion to dismiss. A motion to dismiss under I.R.C.P. 12(b)(6) tests the legal sufficiency
of a complaint. See Hoffer v. City of Boise, 151 ldaho 400, 402,257 P.3d 1226, 1228 (2011). On
appeal, the Court reviews the dismissal of a complaint under the rule de novo. Id. The Court must
determine if the facts alleged in the complaint, if true, are sufficient to entitle the plaintiff to
relief. Id. In doing so, the Court must view all the facts and inferences in favor of the plaintiff
and ask if a claim for relief has been stated. Id. '"The issue is not whether the plaintiff will
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ultimately prevail, but whether the party is ntitled to offer evidence to support the claims.'
Orthman v. ldaho Power Co .• 126 Idaho 960, 962, 895 P.2d 561 , 563 (1995) (internal quotation
marks and citation omitted).
But only factual allegations will satisfy I.R.C.P. 8(a)(2)' s requirement of "a short and
plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief." See Clark v. Olsen,
110 Idaho 323, 325, 715 P.2d 993, 995 (1986) (stating purpose of complaint is to inforrn
def. ndant of material facts upon which action is based). Thus, to survive a Rule 12(b)(6) motion
to dismiss, it is not enough for th complaint to make conclusory allegations. See Owsley v.
Idaho Indus.

omm 'n , 141 Idaho 129, 136, 106 P.3d 455, 462 (2005). "Although the non-

movant is entitled to have his factual assertions treated as true, this privil ge does not extend to
the conclusions oflaw the non-movant hopes the court to draw from those facts." Id. (citation
omitted).
When ruling on Rule 12(b)(6) motions, the courts examine the complaint in its entirety,
including documents incorporated into the complaint by reference. Stewart v. Arrington Constr.
Co., 92 Idaho 526, 530, 446 P.2d 895, 899 (1968) ("Where other matters are incorporated by
reference in the pleadings, the comi may properly consider such matters in passing on the motion
attacking the pleadings."); Colafranceschi v. Briley, 159 Idaho 31, 32 n.l, 355 P.3 d 1261, 1262
n.l (2015) (reviewing dismissal pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6) and drawing factual background "from
the contents of Colafranceschi 's Second Amended Complaint and the attachments thereto").
Furthermore, the courts do not accept as true factual allegations that arc contradicted by
documents incorporated by the complaint See Caldwell v. Village of Mountain Home, 29 Idaho
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13 22, 156 P. 909, 912 (1916) recognizing that general rule that demurrer admits truth of aU
facts that are pleade.d do snot apply '"to fact which appear unfounded by a record inco:rporated
in the pleading, or by a document referred to "' (citation omitt d)); Lazy Y Ranch Ltd. v. Behrens,
546 f.3d 580, 588 (9th Ch. 2008) ("we need not accept as tru · aUegalions contradicting
documents that are referenced in the complaint").
Motion to consolidate. Whether to consolidate separate actions is a decision left to the
district court's discretion. See I.R.C.P. 42(a) (court "may" order consolidation); Rueth v. State,
103 Idaho 74, 80,644 P.2d 1333, 1339 (1 982) (considering whether district court abused its
discretion in denying motion for bifurcation under I.R.C.P. 42(b)). When reviewing an exercise
of discretion by the district court, this Court considers whether the lower court perceived the
issue as one of discretion, acted within the outer limits of its discretion and consistent with the
legal standards applicable to the choices available to it, and reached its decision by an exercise of
reason. Wechsler v. Wechsler, 162 Idaho 900,909,407 P.3d 214,223 (2017).
IV. ATTORNEY FEES AND COSTS ON APPEAL

As.explained in Section V.E. below, SPS requests an award of attorney fees on appeal
under Idaho Code § 12- 12 1 and Idaho Appellate Rule 4 1 and an award of costs under Idaho
Appellate Rule 40.
V. ARGUMENT

A.

Bergeman has waived each of his assignments of error on ap1peal because he fails to
support bis claims w ith authoriity or argument.
Bergeman contends the district court erred in granting SPS and Elabed's motions to

dismiss and in denying his motion to consolidate. AOB 10. But Bergeman o "fers no analysis and
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cites no authority to support his claims of error as required by I.A.R. 35(a (6). See AOB at 16-20.
As a result he has waived those issues on appeal. See Woods v. Sanders, 150 Idaho 53 58, 244
P.3d 197,. 202 (2010) (finding I.A.R. 35(a)(6) was not satisfied when party failed to support issue

on appeal "vith propositions of law or authority . "\l/her,e an appellant fails to assert his
assignments of err )r with particularity and to support his positi n with sufficient authority, those
assignments of error are too indefinite to be heard by the Court." Bach v. Bagley, 148 Idaho 784,
790,229 P.3d 1146, 1152 (2010). It follows that a party waives an issue cited on appeal "if either
authority or argument is lacking, not just if both are lacking. " Bolognese v. Forte, 153 Idaho
857, 866, 292 P.3d 248, 257 (2012) (citation omitted).
Bergeman s opening brief is a general attack on the district court's findings and
conclusions and nothing more. See AOB at 16-20. In dismissing the second amended complaint,
the district court analyzed each cause of action pled, and their clements, against the factual
allegations of the complaint, and found the allegations did not support claims on which relief
could be granted. R. 105-111. On appeal, Bergeman does not explain how the district court erred
in applying the standard for dismissal under Rule 12(b)(6). See AOB at 11-12, 16-20. He does
not even cite the elements of misrepresentation, negligent supervision, trespass, or intentional or
negligent infliction of emotional di stress or attempt to analyze how each claim's elements relate
to his factual allegations. See AOB at 16-20. His opening brief does not mention the trespass or
emotional distress claims at all. See AOB l-21.
Bergeman's contention that the district court erred in denying his motion to consolidate
suffers from the same lack of argument and particularity. J.R.C.P. 42 a)(2) states that the trial
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court "may ... consolidate the actions" if the actions "invol e a common question of lm: or
fact." The district court considered whether this action and Elabed' s eviction action shared
common questions. of law and fact and decided they did not. R. 98- 100. While recog lizing that
standard in bis opening btief se

OB 12-16, B rg inan doe not apply it and does not present

any analysis of the standard or how it relate to the facts fthis ca e, see AOB 20.
Because Bergeman fails to support his assignments of error with argument or authority,
those claims of error are too indefinite to address. As such, he has waived the issues raised on
appeal. See Bach, 148 Idaho at 790,229 P.3d at 1152 (refusing to consider bulk of Bach's claims
on appeal because he failed to support them with relevant argument and authority). The Court
should affirm the di strict court for this reason alone.

B.

Bergeman has not shown the trial court erred in dismissing his second amended
complaint for failure to state a claim upon which relief could be granted.
1.

Bergeman aJleged no facts that the foreclosure of the property was wrongful
and no cause of action that would set aside the foreclosure sale.

Even if Bergeman has not waived his assignments of error, he still has not demonstrated
any error by the district court. In his second amended complaint, Bergeman sought monetary
damages, to set .aside the foreclosure sale, and to stop Elabed's attempted eviction action-all
based on common law claims of misrepresentation, negligent supervision, trespass, and
emotional distress. R. 40-45 . Each cause of action was premised on the underlying assumption
that the foreclosure sale was "wrongful." See generally id. Bergeman, however, did not plead
facts lo support a wrongful foreclosure.
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Under Idaho la" run action for vvrongful forecJosurc is et1uated with a cause of action for

com'ersion. Se Houptv. Well Fa1·g0 Bank, Nat'! A s'n, 160 Idaho 181 , 189-90, 370 P.3d 384,
392-93 (2016) (citations omitted).

lender cannot foreclose a mortgaged property except as

provided by statute, and the ailure to comply with the statutory procedures gives rise to a
conversion action. Peterson v. Hailey Nat. Bank, 51 ldaho 427, 43 I-32, 6 P.2d 145, 147 (1931).
In that situation, the lender becomes liable to th bonower just as anyon else who convert
propc-rty. /d. Thus, the remedy is not the return of the property but damages measured by the
value of the property at the time and place of sale. See id. at 43 3, 6 P .2d at 14 7.

It necessarily follows that Bergeman cannot set aside the foreclosure sale, or halt
Elabed's eviction action, even if the sale was wrongful. But even more problematic for
Bergeman is that he plcd no facts to support a claim of wrongful foreclosure. Other than making
conclusory allegations that the foreclosure sale was "wrongful," "bogus," and "invalid,"
Bergeman did not allege any facts to show that any defendant failed to comply with the
recording, notice, or sale requirements of Idaho Code§§ 45 - 1505 and 45 - 1506. See R. 39-44

(11

11-21). At most, he alleged that the defendants would not answer telephone calls or allow him to
cure the default of a mortgage loan he was not party to. Id.
To be sure, based on ihe second amended complai nt, Bergeman had no rights under the
deed ohrust or the mortgage loan. He admitted that his mother granted WMC Mortgage a dee,d
of trust to secure the loan, R. 36-37

c,12), 53, 55; that following her death he never assumed the

loan, R. 39 (if 13); that the loan remained in the name of the l•statc of Karen Hansen, id.; that he
was not the executor of the estate, see R. 36 (if 1), 48-49; that the loan was in default at the time
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of the foreclo ure sale, AOB 9, 16-17, 18, 19; and that the property was sold to Elabed at the
foreclosure sale R. 37-3 8 ( 6). Following the forecl sure sale, any rights the estat (or
Bergeman) had in the property were extinguished. See Idaho Code § 45- 1508 ("A sale made by a
trustee under this act shall foreclose and terminate all interest in the property covered by the trust
deed of all persons to whom notice is given under section 45- 1506 Idaho Cod .... ").
In sum, Bergeman did not allege facts to show the property was wrnngfoll taken from
his possession. See Houpt, 160 Idaho at 190, 370 P.3d at 393 (stating con ersi 1n r quires distinct
act of wrongfully asserted dominion o .er another's prop rty). Having admitted that he did not
assume the mortgage loan and that the loan was in default, B rgeman did not state a claim for
wrongful foreclosure, and he cannot set aside the foreclosure sale or stop Elabed's attempted
eviction through this action. Bergeman's failure to allege a wrongful foreclosure also undermines
his remaining claims seeking money damages.

2.

The misrepresentation claim fails because Bergeman did not pJead the
factual circumstances constituting each element of fraud with particularity.

SPS now turns to Bergeman's common law claims and request for damages. In the second
amended complaint, Bergeman asserted a cause of action for misrepresentation based on
allegations that "the defendaJilts" refused to discuss the foreclosure with him or his father,
indicated they would accept "a certain payment" but then refused, stated in mortgage statements
that the foreclosu11e sale would be vacated if he "made a mortgage payment," and misled Elabed

into believing the foreclosure sale was valid. R. 40-42 ( 16). T he district court dismissed the
claim because Bergeman failed to plead whh particularity facts showing the defendants'
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knowledge that the a1leged statements were- false their intent that he rely on the stalements, his
right to rely on the statements, or how he was injured. R. I 05- 107.
The district court did not en. Accepting Bergeman's allegations as true, he did not state a
cause of action for misrepresentation. The claim has nine elements: ( 1) a statement of fact, (2) its
falsity) (3) its materiality, (4) the speaker' s knowledge of its fal ity, (5) the speaker's intent that
there b reliance, (6) the hearer' s ignorance of the falsity of the statement, (7) reliance by the
hearer, (8) the hearer's right to rely on the statement (i.e.,justifiable reHance), and (9) resultant
injury. J enkins v. Raise Cascade C01p., ]41 Idaho 233,239, 108 P.3d 380,386 (2005). The
abs nee of just on element precludes recovery. Id. Further, Bergeman must support the
existence of ach element '"by pleading with particularity the factual circumstances constituting
fraud." ' See id. (citation omitted); see also I.R.C.P. 9(b).
The failure to plead each element with specificity is grounds for dismissal. See Jenkins,
141 Idaho at 239-40, 108 P.3d at 386-87. Jenkins illustrates this point. In that case, Jenkins
asserted a claim of fraud related to the tennination of his employment. Id. at 237, 108 P.3d at
384. The district court dismissed the claim because Jenkins failed to plead the fraud elements
with specificity, and the Idaho Supreme Court affirmed. Id. at 239-40, 108 P.3d at 386-87. Both
Jenkins 's original and amended complaints only generally alleged that the defendant was
involved in several false accusations and statements. Id. In particular, there were no facts alleged
that showed Jenkin's reliance on any representations made to him; in fact he admitted that he

knew many of the statements made were false and did nothing about it Id. at 240, 108 P.3d at
387.
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Bergeman,s second amended compJaint also fail ed t specify what factual circum tances
con titute fraud. His a1legations that the defendants failed to discus the status of the foreclosure
sale is not actionable because it involves no statement at all. See R. 41 ( 16(a), (b) ). His
allegation that the defendants indicated they would ace pt "a certain payment" does not specify
which defendant made the statement, when the statement was made, how much should be paid,
that the defendant knew the statement was false, that the defendant intended for him to rely on it,
or that he did right rely on it. See R. 41 Ci1 t 6(c ), (d)). His allegation that the defendants stated the
foreclosure sale would be vacated if he "made a mortgage payment' also does not specify v ho
the speaker was, that the defendant knowingly made a false statement or intended that he rely on
the statement, or that he could rely on it. See R. 41 (116(e ), (f)).
That Bergeman did not adequately plead the elements of fraud is perhaps best shown by
his failure to allege with particularity his right to rely on any of the statements purportedly made
by the defendants. lt is essential that the hearer' s reliance on the representation be justified.

Stewart Title of Idaho, Inc. v. Nampa Land Title Co., 110 Idaho 330,332, 715 P.2d 1000, 1002
(1986). Bergeman' s complaint showed that his reliance was not justified. [n pmiicular, he
acknowledged that he did not assume the mortgage loan and was not the executor of his mother' s
estate, and that the loan was in default. See R. 39 (113). To be sure, the complaint showed that
the Estate of Karen Hansen was the borrower on the loan, that the estate was 745 days delinquent
on the loan, that a total of 17,932.87 was due, and that the borrower " must pay this amount to
bring your loan cuITent." R. 39 ( 13) , 53-63 . nder those allegations, Bergeman had no reason
to believe the alleged statements that he could cure the default of the mortgage loan.
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FinaUy, Bergcman's claim that the defendants committed fraud by misleading Elabed
also fails. See R. 42

,r 16 ,g)- i)). Idaho does not recognize third party fraud in circumstances

such as these. See Beco Constr. Co. v. Bannock Paving Co., 118 Idaho 463 ~468~797 P.2d 863,
868 (1990). Tn Beco Con, 'ltuclion~the alleged misrepres ntation \Vas not directed to the plaintiff.

Id, s a result, the Comi found the plaintiff failed to establish that it was expect d to Iely on the
statement elem nt 5), that it was ignorant of the statement's falsity (element 6), that it relied on
the statement (element 7), or that it had a ri ght to rely on the statement (element 8). ld. The same
is t1ue here. Since Bergeman was not the hearer, he has not alleged facts to support a claim of
misrepresentation based on statements the defendants made to Elabed.

In sum, the Court hould affirm the district court' s dismissal of Bergeman's cause of
action for misrepresentation. Because he fai led to plead the factual circumstances constituting
each element with particularity, he did not state a claim upon which relief can be granted.

3.

The negligent supervision claim fails because Bergeman did not allege facts
to show that SPS owed a duty to protect him from an employ,ee's dangerous
propensities.

The district court also correctly dism issed Bergeman' s cause of action for negligent
supervision. A negligent supervision claim i.s based on the supervisor's negligence in failing to
exercise due care to protect third parties from the foreseeable tortious acts of an employee.
Rausch v. Pocatello Lumber Co., 135 Idaho 80, 86, l4 P.3d 1074, 1080 (Ct. App. 2000). To
establish the claim, a plaintiff must show the defendant owed a legal duty to conform to a
standard of conduct, a breach of that duty, a causal connection between the allegedly negligent

c-0nduct and the plaintiff's injury, and damages. Podolan v. Idaho Legal Aid Servs., Inc., 123
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Idaho 937, 945, 854 P.2d 280,288 (Ct. App. 1993). "Th duty requires the supervisor who
knows of the supervisee's dang rous propensities to control the supervis e so he will not injure
third perso 1s." Id. at 946, 854 P.2d at 289.
According to the district court, Bergeman failed to allege that SPS or Elabed owed him
any duty or that the. t 1tious acts of an employee were foreseeable. R. 106-107. The court also
recognized that Bergeman did not assume the mortgage loan. R. l 07. All that is true. The
complaint provided no factual allegations whatsoever to support the negligent supervision claim.

See R. 36~46. In fact, the words " n gligent supervision"

r words to that effect- w re only

used in the heading of Count One. R. 40. Nowhere in the second amended complaint did
Bergeman allege that SPS (or any other defendant) supervised an employee, knew or should
have known of an employee's dangerous propensities to har n third parties, owed a duty to
protect him from an employee's dangerous propensities, or failed to exercise due care to protect
him from an employee's dangerous propensities, causing him injury. See R. 36-42.

In light of those failures, in his opening brief, Bergeman suggests, without citing any
authority, that the district court improperly focused on the relationship between SPS and Elabed,
rather than the relationship between SPS and its employees. AOB 17, 18. The district court' s
order shows otherwise. See R. 106 (recognizing that negligent supervision claim is not based on
vicarious liability). Bergeman also states that the court ignored "dear statements" made in the
complaint "with respect to the managers and employees of SPS." AOB 9-10. But, again, the
complaint contained no such statements and made no mention of any duty SPS owed to
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superv1s its employees. Gi en Bcrgeman's failure to state a cause of action for negligent
supervision, the Court must affirm the district court' s dismissal of the claim.

4.

The trespass claim fails because Bergeman did not allege facts to support
wrongful foreclosure or eviction or that Ela bed was SPS's agent.

Bergeman' s opening brief makes no mention of his trespass claim at all, and as such, he
has waived any argument that the district com1's dismissa1 of the claim was in error. See supra,
p. 10. But even if the Court considers the cf aim, the district court did not err. Trespass requires a
showing that one wrongfully entered the premises and a causal connection between the
defendant's alleged wrongful conduct and the plaintiffs injury, Mueller v. Hill, 158 Idaho 208,
212- 13, 345 P.3d 998, 1002-03 (2015); Nelson v. Holdaway Land & Cattle Co., 107 Idaho 550,
552, 691 P.2d 796, 798 (Ct. App. 1984). "Trespass is a tort against possession committed when
one, without permission, interferes with another's exclusive right to possession of the property."

Walter E. Wilhite Revocable Living Tr. v. Nw. Yearly Meeting Pension Fund, 128 Idaho 539,
549, 916 P.2d 1264, 1274 (1996).
Without specifying which defendant, Bergeman alleged that "these defendants appointed
their agents, Silver Creek [sic] Realty and Mohamed Elabed to enter on the premises and to
attempt to wrongfully evict the plaintiff and his current tenant thereon." R.. 43 ( 19). He also
alleged that ~ labed entered the property and '"made rmmewus threats that he would take
possession of the personal property of the plaintiff herein and begin various bui lding projects on
the property as a result of the issuance of a bogus trustee's deed." R. 44 ( 21 ). The district court
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found that the facts aUeged failed to shmv Bergeman possessed or had Jegal title t th · p1 p rty
at the time of he alleged trespass or that he suffered any injury to the property. R. l 08.
The district court was correct Silv rcreek Realty and Elabed we1'e statutorily entitled to
possess the prnpe1ty after purchasing it at the forecJosure sale. See ]daho

ode§§ 45-]508, 45-

1506(10)-(11 ). Because Bergeman failed to pres nt facts that support a wrongful foreclosure or
eviction, Silvercreek Realty and Elabed did not wrongfully enter the property, and there can be
no trespass. He also failed to allege any damage to the property, only the threat of damag . See
R. 44

c,r 21).
Lastly, the trespass claim against SPS cannot stand because it was based on the

conclusory allegation that Silvercreek Realty and Elabed were SPS's agents when they entered
the property. R. 38 (i[ 8), 43-44

(,r,r 19, 21). Bergeman did not support his claim of agency with

any factual allegations.2 See id. There are three types of agencies: express authority, implied
authority, and apparent authority. Shatto v. Syringa Surgical Ctr., LLC, 161 Idaho 127, 131, 384
P.3d 374, 378 (2016). Bergeman did not allege facts to support the actual authori ty necessary for
Silvercreek Realty or Elabed to act on behalf ofSPS through express or implied authority. See id.
(explaining that express and implied authority are forms of actual authority). Nor did he allege
any facts to support a reasonable beliefthat they acted on SPS 's behalf via apparent authority.

2

The district court did not address Bergeman's conclusory allegations of agency, but the
Court can. See Kuhn v. Coldwell Banker Landmark, Inc., 150 Idaho 240, 248, 245 P.3d 992,
1000 (2010) (stating that where lower comi's order is con-ect, but based on erroneous theory,
order will be affirmed on correct theory) .
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Se id. at ! ..3 , 384 P .3d a

80 (explaining that npparent authority requires conduct by principal

that would lead person to reasonably believe that another person acts on principa1' s behalf) .
In sum, Bergeman's conclusory allegations of trespass and agency wer insumcient to
show that SPS was directly liable for trespass or vicariously liable for SB ercre k Realty' s or
Elabed 's acts. See Owsley, 141 Idaho at 136, 106 P .3d at 462. The Court should affinn the
district court's d ismissa] of the trespass claim.

5.

The infliction of emotional distress claims fail because Bergeman did not
allege extreme or outrageous conduct (as to intentional infliction) or physical
manifestation of emotional injury (as to negligent infliction).

Like his trespass claim, Bergeman does not address the dismissal of his intentional and
negligent infliction of emotional distress claims in his opening brief: See AOB 1-21. Thus he has
waived any claim of error in the dismissal of those claims. See supra, p. 10. Even so, the di trict
court did not err in di smissing the claims. In his second amended complaint, Bergeman's only
allegation of emotional distress was this: as a result of defendants' "intentional or negligent
effort to take" his property and Elabed's eviction action, he "has suffered extreme emotional
distress and continues to suffer the effect of this stress resulting in further emotional trauma and
grief over the possible loss" of his property. R. 44

c,

21).

The district court correctly found that those allegations do not state a claim for intentional
infliction of emotional distvess. R. l 09-1 lO. The claim requives a plaintiff to show: (]) the
defendanfs conduct was intentional or veckless. (2) the conduct was extreme and outrageous, (3)
there was a causal connection between the condu.c t and the emotional distress, and (4) the
emotional distress was seve~c. Edmondson v. Shearer Lumber Prods., 139 Idaho 172, 179, 75
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P.3d 733, 740 2003). "By requiring b th condu 't of an 'outrageous' nature and ' evere'
emotional distress this rule affords com1s a menns of limiting fictitious claims. ' Hatfieldv. Max

Rouse & Sons Nw.• 100 Idaho 840, 849 606 P.2d 944, 953 (1980), overruled on other grounds
by Brtrwn v. Fritz, 108 ldaho

.>

7, 359- 0, 699 P.2d 137 1, 1373- 74 (1985).

Bergeman's allegations of improper foreclosme and attempted eviction do not constitute
extreme or outrageous behavior. As discussed (at pp. 11 ~13), the second amended complaint
does not support his claim that foreclosure and the attempted eviction were wrongfuL And even
if the allegations were true, Bergeman did not allege that SPS was reckless, extreme, or
outrageous in commencing foreclosure proceedings based on its rights under the mortgage loan.
Idaho courts require "very extreme conduct" before awarding damages for the claim.

Edmondson, 139 Idaho at 180, 75 P.3d at 741. Bergeman must have alleged conduct that rises to
the level of"'atrocious"' or "'beyond all possible bounds of decency."' Id. (citation omitted).
Whether such conduct is "so extreme and outrageous as to pennit recovery is a matter oflaw."

Nation v. State, Dep 't of Corr., 144 Idaho 177, 192, 158 P.3d 95 3,968 (2007).
Examples of extreme and outrageous conduct supporting a claim for intentional infliction
of emotional distress include an insurer's unfair dealings with a grieving widower, Walston v.

Monumental Life Ins. Co., 129 Idaho 211, 2 19-20, 923 P.2d 45 6, 464-65 (1996); real estate
developers swindling a family out of their "li fe long dream," Spence v. Howell, 126 Idaho 763,
774, 890 P.2d 714, 725 (1995); prolonged physical, mental, and sexual abuse, Curtis v. Firth,
123 Idaho 598, 605-06, 850 P.2d 749, 756-57 (1993); or recklessly shooting and killing a donkey
that was a pet and a pack animal, Gill v. Brown, 107 Idaho !137, 1138-39, 695 P.2d 1276, ]277-
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78 (Ct. App. ]985 . See also Hatfield, 100 Idaho at 850, 606 P.2d at 954 (citing case examples of
''very extreme conduct~,).

In contrast, in Edmondson, an employer's conduct surrounding the rightful termination of
an employee did not rise to the level of extreme and outrageous conduct~despite understanding
the termination would cause the employee emotional distress. See 139 Idaho at 180, 75 P.3d at
741; see also Mortensen v. Stewart Title Guar. Co., 149 Idaho 437, 446-47, 235 P.3d 387, 39697 (2010) ("Merely exercising a legal right does not satisfy the outrageousness element of an
emotional-distress claim."). As alleged, SPS's actions fall within the circumstances of

Edmondson, not those of Walston, Spence, or Curtis. Indeed, Bergeman admitted he did not
assume the mortgage loan and that the loan was in default. R. 39

(if 13); AOB 9, 16-17,

18, 19.

SPS did no more than insist on its rights in a permissible way.
As for Bergeman's claim for negligent infliction of emotional distress, the claim requires
a showing of: (1) a legally recognized duty, (2) a breach of that duty, (3)

a causal connection

between the defendant's conduct and the breach, and (4) actual loss or damage. Frogley v.

Meridian Joint Sch. Dist. No. 2, 155 Idaho 558,569,314 P.3d 613, 624 (2013). It also requires
some physical manifestation of the plaintiffs emotional injury. Id. (stating requirement of
physical injury is designed to provide degree of genuineness that claims of mental harm are not
imagined). The district court dismissed the claim because Bergeman failed to allege the
manifestation of a physical injury or a recognized legal duty on the part of SPS. R. 110-11 1.

The district court was correct. Bergeman made no .allegation of having suffered any
physic.al manifestation as a result of his alleged emoti.o nal distress. R. 44 (12L) Rather he made
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the conclusory allegation that he "'suffered extreme ernotiona1 distress and continues to suffer the
effect of this st.rre s 1·esulting in further emotional trauma and griet~~, Id. He also did not aJlege
any legal duty that was breached by the foreclosure. See R. 36-46. SPS had no duty to refrain
from foreclosing on prop 11 that s cured a mo rtgage loan in defau lt. E ven assuming Bergeman
was a borrower under the loan and SPS was a lender, the relationship in a borrower-lender
situation is no more than one of debtor-cTeditor. See Idaho First Nat 'l Bank v. Bliss Valley

Foods, Inc., 121 Idaho 266,277,824 P.2d 841 , 852 (1991). But again, Bergeman admitted he did
not assume the mortgage loan after his mother's death and that the loan was in default.
[n

sum, Bergeman failed to allege and cannot allege facts that would entitle him to relief

for intentional and negligent infliction of emotional distress. The Court must affirm the dismissal
of these claims.

C.

Bergeman has not shown the district court abused its discretion in denying his
motion to consolidate this action with Elabed's eviction action because h.e does not
address the abuse of discretion standard.
If the district court correctly dismissed Bergeman' s amended complaint, there is no need

to address his claim that the court ened in refusing to con olidate this action with Elabed's
separate action to evict the tenant from the property. Even so, Bergeman has shown no error in
the district court•s decision. His Bergeman' s burden to demonstrate that the district court abused
its discretion. See Wechsler, 162 Idaho at 908,407 P.3d at 222. To show the district court abused
its discretion, he argues, only, tbat " [i]t is not hard to conclude that the district court was more
focused on the headache presented to it by virtue of the fi ling of the complaint (and amended
complaints in District Court." AOB 20. Bergeman':s argument fai ]s because he does not address
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the three-part abuse of discretion standard. See Cummings v. Stephens, 160 Idaho 847,853,380
P.3d 168, 174 (2016) (when party fails to address factors, such a "conclusory argument is fatally
deficient" to the party's case).
In addition, he does not demonstrate that the district court violated any paii of the
standard. The district court satisfied the first part of the test, noting that it "may" consolidate
under Rule 42(a). R. 99. It satisfied the second part of the test by properly considering whether
the two actions involved common questions oflaw or fact. R. 99-100. The third prong of the test
is also satisfied, because the district court's decision to deny consolidation was reasonable. In
particular, it recognized that the law governing Bergeman's common law claims in this action is
far different than the statutes governing tenancy and eviction proceedings. Id.
Having failed to address or apply the abuse of discretion standard, Bergeman has shown
no error in the district court's decision to deny his motion to consolidate. See Cummings, 160
Idaho at 853,380 P.3d at 174 (affirming decision to grant motion for I.R.C.P. 60(b) relief);

Wechsler, 162 Idaho at 909-10, 407 P.3d at 223-24 (affirming decision to grant motion to
compel). As such, the Court must affirm that decision.
D.

Bergeman is not entitled to attorney fees and costs on appeal because he cites no
legal authority for such awards.

In his opening brief, Bergeman seeks attorney fees on appeal based on the district court's
"gross misapplication of the facts and the law" and SPS and Elabed's "efforts to mislead" the
district court. AOB 10. A party is entitled to attorney fees on appeal only if a statute, contract, or
court rule authorizes fees. Armandv. Opportunity Mgmt. Co., 155 Idaho 592,602, 315 P.3d 245,
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255 (2013). ike the rest oJhis arguments on appeal, B rgeman cites no authority for his request;
and faiUng to do so, he m akes no attempts lo apply it. See AOB lO. Those failures preclude an
award of attorney fees or costs on appeal. Se• late v. Zichko~ I 29 Idaho 259, 263, 923 P.2d 966,
970 (1996) ("When issues on appeal are not supported by propositions oflaw, authority, or
argument th

, vill not be c.onsidered. '); Banner Life i ns. Co. v. Mark Walla e Dixson

Irrevocable Tr., 147 Idaho 11 7, 132-33 , 206 P.3d 481 , 496-97 (2009) (denying award of attorney
fees on app al where party " failed to support her request with both argument and authority.").

E.

If SPS prevails, it is entitled to its attorney fees and costs on appeal under Idaho
Code§ 12-121 and the Idaho Appellate Rules.
SPS seeks its costs on appeal under I.A R. 40. SPS also seeks its attorney fees on appeal

under Idaho Code§ 12-1 2 1, which permits the Court to award reasonable attorney fees to the
prevailing party. Under the statute, an award of attorney fees on appeal is appropriate if the Court
"determines that the action was brought or pursued frivolously, unreasonably or without
foundation. " Turner v. Turner, 155 Idaho 819, 82 7, 317 P.3d 716, 724 (2013). " An appeal may
be deemed frivolous, and attorney fees awarded, for failure to properly comply with I.A.R.
35(a)(6)." Woods, 150 Idaho at 61,244 P.3d at 205 (awarding at1orney fees against party who
failed to support arguments and allegations with citations to specific relevant legal authority) .
In Turner and Woods, 1he Court awarded attorney fees to the respondent when the
appellant failed to develop an argument as to the issues on appeal and failed to present little by
way of citation to authority. Turner, 155 Idaho at 827, 317 P.3d at 724; Woods, 150 Idaho at 61 ,
244 P.3d at 205. Here Bergeman waived his assignments of error on appeal due to his failure to
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provide argument and citation to authority as required by I.A.R. 35(a)(6). In short, Bergeman has
failed to present a cogent argument as to why it should prevail on appeal. As a result, an award
of SPS 's attorney fees is appropriate under to Idaho Code § 12-121 and I.A.R. 41.

VI. CONCLUSION
SPS respectfully requests the Court affirm the trial court's dismissal of Bergeman's
amended complaint and denial of his motion to consolidate. Bergeman has waived each
assignment of error by failing to cite either authority or argument in his opening brief. Even
considering his assignments of en-or, Bergeman failed to allege facts that would support granting
relief for wrongful foreclosure or on any of his common law claims. He also failed to show the
district court violated any part of the abuse of discretion test in denying his motion to
consolidate.
DATED: May 21, 2018.

W. Chris opher Pooser
Elijah M. Watkins
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Servicing

-2696875310.4 0052161-04991

CERTIFJCATE OF SERVICE
I HEREB , CERTIFY that on May 21, 2018, I e1ved a true and correct copy of the
for going BRIEF OF RESPONDENT SELECT PORTFOLIO SERVICING on the
following, in the matteI indicated belov :
R )bert K. B ck
ROBERT K. BECK & ASSOCIATES, P.C.
3456 E. 1ih Street, Suite 215

Idaho Falls, Idaho 83406
Email: flbecklaw@ida.net
Steven L. Taggart
Maynes Taggart PLLC
P.O. Box 3005
Idaho •alls, Idaho 83405
Email: staggart IO l @gmail.com

Via Facsimile
Via Overnight Mail
Via Hand Deli ery
¥ ' Via Email

[

Via U.S. Mail
l ] Via Facsimile
[ ] Via Overnight Mail
~ ~ .}ia. Han.d. Delivery

l¥

w.

-2796815310.4 0052 16 l -04991

l ]
I ]
l ]

ViaEmail

